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High-probability grants
According to our matching algorithm, Justin Kruger is the likely recipient of the following grants.
| Years |
Recipients |
Code |
Title / Keywords |
Matching
score |
| 2004 — 2005 |
Kruger, Justin |
N/AActivity Code Description:
No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Egocentrism in Self Vs. Other Comparisons: On the (Not So) Comparative Nature of Social Comparisons @ University of Illinois At Urbana-Champaign
People tend to be unrealistically optimistc. That is, on average, participants estimate that they are more likely than the average student to experience the desirable events and less likely than the average student to experience the undesirable events (Weinstein, 1980). This optimism about the future can have severe consequences. For instance, each year thousands of individuals die in alcohol-related automobile accidents, in part because they underestimate the likelihood that driving drunk may get them into trouble. As well, people frequently risk unprotected sex in part because they underestimate their likelihood of contracting a sexually transmitted disease.
While the consequences of unrealistic optimism are clear, the causes are not. The three studies funded by this award will explore the reasons why people are unrealistically optimistic about their futures and uncover ways in which unrealistic optimism-and the various societal consequences it engenders-can be reduced.
The specific explanation that will be tested is that when people compare their likelihood of experiencing an event with that of the average person, they focus on their own perceived likelihood of experiencing an event (how likely am I to live past 70?) and insufficiently consider the chances of the average person experiencing the event (how likely is the average person to live past 70?). When the event is relatively common, like living past 70, this leads to an overestimation of one's comparative likelihood of experiencing the event. When the event is relatively uncommon, in contrast, it leads to an underestimation. This translates into unrealistic optimism in the case of common desirable events and rare undesirable events-but unrealistic pessimism in the case of common undesirable events and rare desirable events. This suggests that unrealistic optimism can be reduced by simply drawing people's attention to the risks facing the average person-precisely the proposition to be tested. Additionally, this research may challenge one of the most basic assumptions of social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954). Some social comparisons, it turns out, are neither social nor comparative.
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