1997 — 2001 |
Roese, Neal J |
R29Activity Code Description: Undocumented code - click on the grant title for more information. |
Two Stage Model of Counterfactual Thinking @ Northwestern University
Counterfactuals are thoughts of what "might have been." They are mental representations of possible past outcomes that could have taken place but did not. Counterfactuals merit serious scientific investigation from a psychological perspective because a) they are extremely common, constituting a pervasive feature of mental life, b) they are linked to many unique emotional experiences, particularly regret, and these linkages suggest new insights into coping and adjustment processes, and c) they influence a variety of social judgments, some of which are adaptive (e.g., they may enhance performance) and others of which are dysfunctional (e.g., they may exacerbate judgmental errors). Given the importance of affective and judgmental consequences of counterfactual thinking, a clear understanding of their determinants is of obvious importance. A new 2-stage model of counterfactual generation, one that complements the dominant model of past research (Norm Theory), is presented and tested. Key features--of this model are the partition of counterfactual generation into 2 stages: an initial activation of counterfactual processing, followed by the shaping and constraining of the semantic content of counterfactual thoughts. Accordingly, the determinants of counterfactual generation are divided into two classes of variables, those that serve primarily to "trigger," or activate, counterfactual processing, and those that subsequently "shape" the semantic content of counterfactual representations. The proposed research is intended to provide empirical confirmation for the main assertions of the 2SM. The first set of studies examines. in a laboratory setting, the impact of 4 motivationally derived factors on counterfactual activation and content. The second set of laboratory studies examines the interactive effects of these motivational factors in combination with some factors previously articulated in the counterfactual literature (e.g., exceptionality of antecedent actions) on counterfactual activation and content. The third set explores, using survey/regression designs targeting real world experiences, these same factors in terms of their relation to the perceived potency, lucidity, and persistence of counterfactual thinking. An auxiliary set of studies, not specifically derived from the 2SM but rooted in the same methodological innovations central to this proposal, focuses on the relation of the hindsight bias to counterfactual thinking.
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0.942 |
2004 — 2008 |
Roese, Neal J |
R01Activity Code Description: To support a discrete, specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing his or her specific interest and competencies. |
A Two-Stage Model of Counterfactual Thinking @ University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
[unreadable] DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Counterfactuals are thoughts of what might have been, of what could have occurred in the past if only some detail or action were altered. These thoughts influence a range of emotions, cognitions, and behavior, are closely related to rumination, and have recently been found to be associated with depression and schizophrenia. The previous grant tested a Two-Stage Motivational Model (2SM) of counterfactual thinking and generated several important findings. A revision to this theory, the goal inference perspective, is tested in the present application. This goal inference perspective argues that counterfactuals are for the most part goal-directed and a component of behavior regulation, suggesting that nearly all previously identified determinants of counterfactual thinking exert their effects by way of alteration to goal inferences. Aim 1 of this application is to test the main propositions of this perspective, for example that counterfactuals in and of themselves activate goal inferences, and that negative affect activates counterfactual thinking with mediation by goal progress inferences. Aim 2 is to follow-up two key discoveries from the previous funding period that have particular implications for this goal inference perspective: a domain-specific sex difference in counterfactual thinking that is best understood using regulatory focus theory, and impoverished counterfactual thinking in schizophrenia patients. Aim 3 is to draw theoretical connections to other kinds of comparative judgment, social and temporal comparison, using the insights of this goal inference perspective. The overall objective is to forge a new and comprehensive theoretical specification of counterfactual thinking. [unreadable] [unreadable]
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1 |
2008 — 2012 |
Roese, Neal |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Forensic Animation: Hindsight Bias and Counterfactual Thinking in Judgments of Dynamically Unfolding Events @ University of Illinois At Urbana-Champaign
This project examines how legal decision-making is affected by new advances in the technology of evidence presentation. The project focuses specifically on the use of computer animated video scenes, in which crimes or accidents are "re-created" in cinematic style scene. In courtrooms across the nation, these "forensic animations" are used to explain and clarify complicated arrays of physical evidence. For example, in trials involving homicide or accidents, evidence collected from the scene may be used to inform a cinematic re-creation of what actually happened. Forensic animation can indeed be persuasive, because it may create a vivid sense of actually being there and witnessing first-hand the events in question. However, crime and accident reconstruction always contain inherent uncertainty that visually impressive animation may obscure. This research project uses the laboratory research tools of experimental social-cognitive psychology to understand the impact of forensic animation.
Prior research conducted in the Principal Investigator's laboratory at the University of Illinois has established that forensic animation can backfire, in that it can increase the hindsight bias. A widely-studied cognitive error common to most people, the hindsight bias is the tendency to exaggerate the past predictability of once-future outcomes. That is, after learning the details of an outcome, people tend to believe that they "knew it along." The hindsight bias has been singled out as a particularly vexing problem in legal decision-making, in that it can make jurors unreasonably punitive. In cases involving liability, negligence, or malpractice, the onus under American law is to judge only in terms of what the accused knew at the time of the accident, not on the basis of information available only in hindsight. Thus, an understanding of the cognitive basis of hindsight bias may unlock new tools for improving the quality of legal decision-making. The current research project brings the latest laboratory techniques for studying, as well as mitigating, the hindsight bias to address concerns regarding the psychological impact of forensic animation.
By taking into account aspects of the presentation of forensic animation in the courtroom setting (for example, number of repetitions, visual point of view, slow-motion versus normal speed of replay), this research can show under what circumstances hindsight bias is increased or decreased by forensic animation. In turn, these research findings may suggest new guidelines for the appropriate use of forensic animation in American courts of law.
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0.915 |