2017 — 2018 |
Bull Kovera, Margaret Evelo, Andrew |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Extra-Legal Information Transfer During Eyewitness Identification @ Cuny John Jay College of Criminal Justice
Eyewitness misidentification remains the chief contributing factor to wrongful convictions that have been overturned with DNA evidence. To improve identifications, eyewitness researchers recommend that all lineups be conducted using administrators who do not know which lineup member is the suspect (i.e., double-blind). The concern is that if lineup administrators know the suspect's identity, they may unconsciously influence witnesses to pick the suspect, increasing the risk of an innocent suspect being identified and convicted. Psychologists have shown that this influence does occur and have hypothesized that it is the result of subtle "informational cues" --that is, administrator behaviors that indicate to the witness which person they should select. However, the direct transfer of information from administrator to witness has never been empirically demonstrated. If this information transfer occurs, the behavioral cues are extra-legal information that bias witnesses' decisions; yet the legal system assumes that witnesses base their decision on their memory and that this selection is not contaminated by information provided by the investigators. Moreover, as the double-blind recommendation comes under scrutiny, scientists will need to conduct research that examines the underlying procedural fairness of using lineup administrators who know which lineup member is the suspect. The goal of this research is to address these issues by identifying the underlying informational mechanisms of lineup administrator influence. Classic dual-process models in psychology provide one possible framework for understanding when information transfer will occur in that they propose individuals process information only if they are motivated and able to do so. Therefore, motivation and ability should affect whether information transfer occurs during lineups if it is the mechanism by which single-blind administrators influence lineup decisions. First, administrators should be more likely to send information when they are motivated and able. Study 1 tests this hypothesis in a standard eyewitness paradigm by manipulating administrator knowledge (ability), rewards for suspect identifications (financial motivation), and case realism (psychological motivation). Second, witnesses should be more likely to process and use informational cues when they are motivated and able. Study 2 tests this hypothesis by manipulating administrator steering (cue presence), the witnesses executive functioning (cognitive ability), and reward for selecting the suspect (finical motivation). In both studies -- and only if information transfer is happening -- witnesses will be more likely to identify the suspect following manipulations that increase the ability and motivation to process extra-legal information.
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