Year |
Citation |
Score |
2017 |
Belloni A, Lopomo G, Wang S. Resource Allocation Under Demand Uncertainty and Private Information Management Science. 63: 4219-4235. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.2016.2574 |
0.577 |
|
2013 |
Krishna RV, Lopomo G, Taylor CR. Stairway to heaven or highway to hell: Liquidity, sweat equity, and the uncertain path to ownership Rand Journal of Economics. 44: 104-127. DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12013 |
0.46 |
|
2011 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G, Marx LM. The economics of contingent re-auctions American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 3: 165-193. DOI: 10.1257/Mic.3.2.165 |
0.42 |
|
2011 |
Lopomo G, Marx LM, McAdams D, Murray B. Carbon allowance auction design: An assessment of options for the United States Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 5: 25-43. DOI: 10.1093/Reep/Req024 |
0.387 |
|
2011 |
Lopomo G, Rigotti L, Shannon C. Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard Journal of Economic Theory. 146: 1148-1172. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2011.03.018 |
0.404 |
|
2011 |
Lopomo G, Marx LM, Sun P. Bidder collusion at first-price auctions Review of Economic Design. 15: 177-211. DOI: 10.1007/S10058-010-0104-9 |
0.378 |
|
2010 |
Anton JJ, Brusco S, Lopomo G. Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data Games and Economic Behavior. 69: 24-41. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1589715 |
0.388 |
|
2010 |
Belloni A, Lopomo G, Wang S. Multidimensional Mechanism Design: Finite-Dimensional Approximations and Efficient Computation Operations Research. 58: 1079-1089. DOI: 10.1287/Opre.1100.0824 |
0.556 |
|
2010 |
Varma GD, Lopomo G. Non-Cooperative Entry Deterrence in License Auctions: Dynamic Versus Sealed Bid Journal of Industrial Economics. 58: 450-476. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-6451.2010.00415.X |
0.387 |
|
2009 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G, Marx LM. The 'Google effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz auction Information Economics and Policy. 21: 101-114. DOI: 10.1016/J.Infoecopol.2009.03.001 |
0.344 |
|
2009 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G. Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints Economic Theory. 38: 105-124. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-007-0217-8 |
0.38 |
|
2008 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G. Budget constraints and demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions Journal of Industrial Economics. 56: 113-142. DOI: 10.1111/J.1467-6451.2008.00335.X |
0.397 |
|
2007 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G, Robinson DT, Viswanathan S. Efficient mechanisms for mergers and acquisitions International Economic Review. 48: 995-1035. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-2354.2007.00452.X |
0.429 |
|
2006 |
Dai C, Lewis TR, Lopomo G. Delegating management to experts The Rand Journal of Economics. 37: 503-520. DOI: 10.1111/J.1756-2171.2006.Tb00028.X |
0.33 |
|
2005 |
Lopomo G, Marshall RC, Marx LM. Inefficiency of collusion at english auctions Contributions to Theoretical Economics. 5. DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1156 |
0.422 |
|
2002 |
Brusco S, Lopomo G. Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities Review of Economic Studies. 69: 407-436. DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00211 |
0.332 |
|
2002 |
Agrawal V, Lopomo G, Seshadri S. Web Based Capacity Allocation Strategies for Customers with Heterogeneous Preferences Electronic Commerce Research. 2: 359-384. DOI: 10.1023/A:1020515531179 |
0.438 |
|
2001 |
Lopomo G, Ok EA. Bargaining, interdependence, and the rationality of fair division Rand Journal of Economics. 32: 263-283. DOI: 10.2307/2696409 |
0.36 |
|
2001 |
Lopomo G. Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction Games and Economic Behavior. 36: 219-240. DOI: 10.1006/Game.2000.0817 |
0.443 |
|
1998 |
Economides N, Lopomo G, Woroch GA. Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing Industrial Organization. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1736 |
0.301 |
|
1998 |
Lopomo G. The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions Journal of Economic Theory. 82: 144-166. DOI: 10.1006/Jeth.1998.2425 |
0.371 |
|
1996 |
Economides N, Lopomo G, Woroch GA. Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance Industrial and Corporate Change. 5: 1013-1028. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.41234 |
0.324 |
|
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