| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2017 |
Hart O, Zingales L. Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value Social Science Research Network. 2: 247-275. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.3004794 |
0.627 |
|
| 2015 |
Hart O, Zingales L. Liquidity and inefficient investment Journal of the European Economic Association. 13: 737-769. DOI: 10.1111/Jeea.12130 |
0.596 |
|
| 2014 |
Hart O, Zingales L. Banks Are Where the Liquidity Is National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2471277 |
0.582 |
|
| 2014 |
Christopher Borek T, Frattarelli A, Hart O. Tax shelters or efficient tax planning? A theory of the firm perspective on the economic substance doctrine Journal of Law and Economics. 57: 975-1000. DOI: 10.1086/680929 |
0.346 |
|
| 2013 |
Hart O. Noncontractible investments and reference points Games. 4: 437-456. DOI: 10.3390/g4030437 |
0.36 |
|
| 2012 |
Hart O. An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm The Economic Nature of the Firm: a Reader, Third Edition. 346-352. DOI: 10.2307/1122818 |
0.437 |
|
| 2011 |
Hart O, Zingales L. A new capital regulation for large financial institutions American Law and Economics Review. 13: 453-490. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.1481779 |
0.597 |
|
| 2011 |
Hart O. Thinking about the firm: A review of daniel spulber's the theory of the firm Journal of Economic Literature. 49: 101-113. DOI: 10.1257/Jel.49.1.101 |
0.459 |
|
| 2010 |
Hart O, Holmstrom B. A theory of firm scope Quarterly Journal of Economics. 125: 483-513. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.355860 |
0.434 |
|
| 2009 |
Hart O. Hold-up, Asset ownership, and reference points Quarterly Journal of Economics. 124: 267-300. DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.267 |
0.335 |
|
| 2009 |
Fehr E, Hart O, Zehnder C. Contracts, reference points, and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation Journal of the European Economic Association. 7: 561-572. DOI: 10.1162/Jeea.2009.7.2-3.561 |
0.402 |
|
| 2009 |
Hart O. Regulation and Sarbanes-Oxley Journal of Accounting Research. 47: 437-445. DOI: 10.1111/J.1475-679X.2009.00329.X |
0.342 |
|
| 2008 |
Hart O, Moore J. Contracts as Reference Points Quarterly Journal of Economics. 123: 1-48. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.956999 |
0.38 |
|
| 2008 |
Hart O. Economica coase lecture reference points and the theory of the firm Economica. 75: 404-411. DOI: 10.1111/J.1468-0335.2007.00659.X |
0.474 |
|
| 2008 |
Djankov S, Hart O, McLiesh C, Shleifer A. Debt enforcement around the world Journal of Political Economy. 116: 1105-1149. DOI: 10.1086/595015 |
0.419 |
|
| 2004 |
Hart O, Moore J. Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out But Do Not Rule in Lse Research Online Documents On Economics. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.517665 |
0.314 |
|
| 2003 |
Hart O. Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an application to public-private partnerships Economic Journal. 113: C69-C76. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.00119 |
0.424 |
|
| 2001 |
Hart O. Norms and the theory of the firm University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 149: 1701. DOI: 10.2307/3312896 |
0.368 |
|
| 2001 |
Bebchuk LA, Hart O. Takeover Bids Vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.290584 |
0.456 |
|
| 2001 |
Hart O. Financial contracting Journal of Economic Literature. 39: 1079-1100. |
0.351 |
|
| 1999 |
Hart O, Moore J. Foundations of incomplete contracts Review of Economic Studies. 66: 115-138. DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00080 |
0.32 |
|
| 1998 |
Hart O, Moore J. Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W6421 |
0.431 |
|
| 1997 |
Hart O, Shleifer A, Vishny RW. The proper scope of government: Theory and an application to prisons Quarterly Journal of Economics. 112: 1127-1161. DOI: 10.1162/003355300555448 |
0.337 |
|
| 1997 |
Hart O, La Porta Drago R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Moore J. A new bankruptcy procedure that uses multiple auctions European Economic Review. 41: 461-473. DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00015-9 |
0.346 |
|
| 1996 |
Thakor AV, Hart O. Firms, Contracts and Financial Structures. Journal of Finance. 51: 1555. DOI: 10.2307/2329406 |
0.411 |
|
| 1996 |
Hart O. An economist's view of authority Rationality and Society. 8: 371-386. DOI: 10.1177/104346396008004002 |
0.393 |
|
| 1996 |
Hart O, Moore J. The governance of exchanges: Members' cooperatives versus outside ownership Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 12: 53-69. DOI: 10.1093/Oxrep/12.4.53 |
0.348 |
|
| 1995 |
Hart O. Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications The Economic Journal. 105: 678-689. DOI: 10.2307/2235027 |
0.457 |
|
| 1995 |
Hart O. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure Oup Catalogue. DOI: 10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 |
0.501 |
|
| 1994 |
Hart O, Moore J. Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management The American Economic Review. 85: 567-585. DOI: 10.3386/W4886 |
0.4 |
|
| 1989 |
Hart O. Bargaining and strikes Quarterly Journal of Economics. 104: 25-42. DOI: 10.2307/2937833 |
0.339 |
|
| 1985 |
Guesnerie R, Hart O. Welfare Losses Due to Imperfect Competition: Asymptotic Results for Cournot Nash Equilibria with and without Free Entry International Economic Review. 26: 525-545. DOI: 10.2307/2526701 |
0.317 |
|
| 1982 |
Hart O. A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features Quarterly Journal of Economics. 97: 109-138. DOI: 10.2307/1882629 |
0.425 |
|
| 1980 |
Grossman S, Hart O. Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids Journal of Finance. 35: 323-334. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-6261.1980.Tb02161.X |
0.391 |
|
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