| Year |
Citation |
Score |
| 2020 |
Cooper DJ, Hamman JR, Weber RA. Fool Me Once: An Experiment on Credibility and Leadership The Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1093/Ej/Ueaa059 |
0.398 |
|
| 2020 |
Garretsen H, Stoker JI, Weber RA. Economic perspectives on leadership: Concepts, causality, and context in leadership research Leadership Quarterly. 31: 101410. DOI: 10.1016/J.Leaqua.2020.101410 |
0.305 |
|
| 2020 |
Ging-Jehli NR, Schneider FH, Weber RA. On self-serving strategic beliefs Games and Economic Behavior. 122: 341-353. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2020.04.016 |
0.325 |
|
| 2019 |
Bartling B, Valero V, Weber RA. On the Scope of Externalities in Experimental Markets Experimental Economics. 22: 610-624. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2770498 |
0.318 |
|
| 2018 |
Beath A, BenYishay A, d’Adda G, Grosjean P, Weber RA. Can vouchers reduce elite capture of local development projects? Experimental evidence from the Solomon Islands Journal of Public Economics. 160: 117-131. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jpubeco.2018.02.011 |
0.311 |
|
| 2017 |
Engl F, Riedl A, Weber RA. Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences and Beliefs Research Memorandum. DOI: 10.26481/Umagsb.2017016 |
0.418 |
|
| 2017 |
d’Adda G, Darai D, Pavanini N, Weber RA. Do Leaders Affect Ethical Conduct Journal of the European Economic Association. 15: 1177-1213. DOI: 10.1093/Jeea/Jvw027 |
0.384 |
|
| 2016 |
Gino F, Norton MI, Weber RA. Motivated bayesians: Feeling moral while acting egoistically Journal of Economic Perspectives. 30: 189-212. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.30.3.189 |
0.413 |
|
| 2016 |
Salmon TC, Weber RA. Maintaining Efficiency While Integrating Entrants From Lower Performing Groups: An Experimental Study Economic Journal. DOI: 10.1111/Ecoj.12308 |
0.329 |
|
| 2016 |
Kriss PH, Blume A, Weber RA. Coordination with decentralized costly communication Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 130: 225-241. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2016.07.003 |
0.301 |
|
| 2015 |
Brandts J, Cooper DJ, Weber RA. Legitimacy, communication, and leadership in the turnaround game Management Science. 61: 2627-2645. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.2014.2021 |
0.331 |
|
| 2015 |
Bartling B, Weber RA, Yao L. Do markets erode social responsibility? Quarterly Journal of Economics. 130: 219-266. DOI: 10.1093/Qje/Qju031 |
0.343 |
|
| 2015 |
Georganas S, Healy PJ, Weber RA. On the persistence of strategic sophistication Journal of Economic Theory. 159: 369-400. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2015.07.012 |
0.3 |
|
| 2014 |
Bartling B, Engl F, Weber RA. Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? - An experimental study European Economic Review. 70: 512-524. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.2284074 |
0.361 |
|
| 2014 |
As˚tebro T, Herz H, Nanda R, Weber RA. Seeking the roots of entrepreneurship: Insights from behavioral economics Journal of Economic Perspectives. 28: 49-69. DOI: 10.1257/Jep.28.3.49 |
0.403 |
|
| 2014 |
Malmendier U, Te Velde VL, Weber RA. Rethinking reciprocity Annual Review of Economics. 6: 849-874. DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080213-041312 |
0.339 |
|
| 2013 |
Gino F, Krupka EL, Weber RA. License to cheat: Voluntary regulation and ethical behavior Management Science. 59: 2187-2203. DOI: 10.1287/Mnsc.1120.1699 |
0.387 |
|
| 2013 |
Krupka EL, Weber RA. Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? Journal of the European Economic Association. 11: 495-524. DOI: 10.1111/Jeea.12006 |
0.402 |
|
| 2013 |
Neo WS, Yu M, Weber RA, Gonzalez C. The effects of time delay in reciprocity games Journal of Economic Psychology. 34: 20-35. DOI: 10.1016/J.Joep.2012.11.001 |
0.344 |
|
| 2012 |
Lazear EP, Malmendier U, Weber RA. Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. 4: 136-163. DOI: 10.1257/App.4.1.136 |
0.368 |
|
| 2012 |
McEvily B, Radzevick JR, Weber RA. Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust Games and Economic Behavior. 74: 285-298. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2011.06.011 |
0.325 |
|
| 2011 |
Kogan S, Kwasnica AM, Weber RA. Coordination in the presence of asset markets American Economic Review. 101: 927-947. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.101.2.927 |
0.357 |
|
| 2011 |
Hamman JR, Weber RA, Woon J. An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods American Journal of Political Science. 55: 738-752. DOI: 10.1111/J.1540-5907.2011.00531.X |
0.366 |
|
| 2010 |
Hamman JR, Loewenstein G, Weber RA. Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship American Economic Review. 100: 1826-1846. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.100.4.1826 |
0.335 |
|
| 2010 |
Rick S, Weber RA. Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback Games and Economic Behavior. 68: 716-730. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.10.004 |
0.303 |
|
| 2010 |
Haisley EC, Weber RA. Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior Games and Economic Behavior. 68: 614-625. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2009.08.002 |
0.384 |
|
| 2009 |
Krupka E, Weber RA. The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior Journal of Economic Psychology. 30: 307-320. DOI: 10.1016/J.Joep.2008.11.005 |
0.374 |
|
| 2007 |
Hamman J, Rick S, Weber RA. Solving coordination failure with "all-or-none" group-level incentives Experimental Economics. 10: 285-303. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.900383 |
0.379 |
|
| 2007 |
Kuang X(, Weber RA, Dana J. How effective is advice from interested parties?. An experimental test using a pure coordination game Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 62: 591-604. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2005.03.010 |
0.394 |
|
| 2007 |
Patty JW, Weber RA. Letting the good times roll: A theory of voter inference and experimental evidence Public Choice. 130: 293-310. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-006-9084-2 |
0.385 |
|
| 2007 |
Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang JX. Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness Economic Theory. 33: 67-80. DOI: 10.1007/S00199-006-0153-Z |
0.373 |
|
| 2006 |
Lazear E, Malmendier U, Weber R. Sorting, Prices, and Social Preferences National Bureau of Economic Research. DOI: 10.3386/W12041 |
0.381 |
|
| 2006 |
Patty JW, Weber RA. Agreeing to Fight: An Explanation of the Democratic Peace Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 5: 305-320. DOI: 10.2139/Ssrn.297665 |
0.374 |
|
| 2006 |
Loewenstein G, Moore DA, Weber RA. Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others Experimental Economics. 9: 281-295. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-006-9128-Y |
0.334 |
|
| 2006 |
Weber RA, Camerer CF. "Behavioral experiments" in economics Experimental Economics. 9: 187-192. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-006-9121-5 |
0.399 |
|
| 2005 |
Glasgow G, Weber RA. Is there a relationship between election outcomes and perceptions of personal economic well-being? A test using post-election economic expectations Electoral Studies. 24: 581-601. DOI: 10.1016/J.Electstud.2005.02.001 |
0.363 |
|
| 2004 |
Weber RA, Camerer CF, Knez M. Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and "weak link" coordination games Experimental Economics. 7: 25-48. DOI: 10.1023/A:1026257921046 |
0.379 |
|
| 2003 |
Weber RA. 'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game Games and Economic Behavior. 44: 134-144. DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00002-2 |
0.336 |
|
| 2001 |
Weber R, Camerer C, Rottenstreich Y, Knez M. The Illusion of Leadership: Misattribution of Cause in Coordination Games Organization Science. 12: 582-598. DOI: 10.1287/Orsc.12.5.582.10090 |
0.389 |
|
| 2001 |
Weber RA. Behavior and Learning in the “Dirty Faces” Game Experimental Economics. 4: 229-242. DOI: 10.1007/Bf01673535 |
0.387 |
|
| 2000 |
McKelvey RD, Palfrey TR, Weber RA. The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2×2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 42: 523-548. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00102-5 |
0.374 |
|
| 1999 |
Camerer CF, Weber RA. The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: A re-examination of Staw and Hoang's NBA data Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 39: 59-82. DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00026-8 |
0.369 |
|
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