Colin Camerer - US grants
Affiliations: | California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA |
Area:
Economics, NeuroeconomicsWebsite:
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The funding information displayed below comes from the NIH Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools and the NSF Award Database.The grant data on this page is limited to grants awarded in the United States and is thus partial. It can nonetheless be used to understand how funding patterns influence mentorship networks and vice-versa, which has deep implications on how research is done.
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High-probability grants
According to our matching algorithm, Colin Camerer is the likely recipient of the following grants.Years | Recipients | Code | Title / Keywords | Matching score |
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1985 — 1989 | Camerer, Colin Kunreuther, Howard (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
How Biases in Individual Judgments Affect Market Outcome @ University of Pennsylvania |
0.915 |
1988 — 1992 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Coping With Risk: the Role of Insurance, Compensation and Protective Behavior @ University of Pennsylvania Many decisions made by individuals, firms, consumers, citizens' groups, governments, regulatory bodies and courts involve dealing with potential misfortunes or catastrophes before they occur-- through insurance, risk avoidance behavior, or compensation for risk bearing-- or after they occur--through private or government compensation. These decisions often appear to be inconsistant, inequitable or irrational. Insurers, uncertain about future awards, refuse to offer policies against certain risks because they base their decisions on worst-case scenarios. Individuals react to risks inconsistently, treating small risks as though they were nonexistent (failing to wear seatbelts or to take precautions against AIDS) or so large as to overwhelm all other considerations (opposition to genetic recombination). Governmental attempts to respond to such concerns are often ad- hoc, such as the Delaney amendment, resulting in unanticipated contradictory outcomes. This collaborative interdisciplinary research program examines these puzzling features of behavior within a multi-disciplinary tradition of research on biases and fallacies in decision making. It investigates the question of whether these biases distort the functioning of institutions, markets and societal allocation of resources. The research will develop and evaluate several approaches designed to correct decision biases or protect individuals from their effects, including education, novel ways of presenting information, and mixed strategies coupling incentives and regulations with insurance and compensation. The research plan organizes biases into four categories: reference-point effects, in which preferences for outcomes depend on what they are compared to; contingent weighting, in which choice depends on the way in which a decision is expressed; decision rules, in which absolute priority is given to one attribute (e.g. saving money, avoiding catastrophic consequences); and threshold effects, in which small risks or costs (e.g. the risk of one cigarette or the extra cost of low- deductible insurance) are totally ignored even if they are repeated. The research will examine whether such biases affect decisions about offering or purchasing insurance, setting premiums, compensating victims of misfortune, compensating people for the risk of misfortune beforehand, and engaging in protective behavior. Multiple methods will be used, including questionnaires, laboratory studies, experimental markets, process-tracing, field studies, and microeconomic analysis. The results will bear on theoretical controversies within psychology, economics and decision theory about the relevance of biases to real decision making, on the question of whether market competition reduces the effects of bias, and on questions about the nature of bias itself. |
0.915 |
1991 — 1993 | Camerer, Colin Johnson, Eric |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
An Experimental Study of Rationality and Learning in Noncooperative Games @ University of Pennsylvania Most game-theoretic applications in economics assume players are rational, mutually rational, and purely self-interested. In experimental studies of games one or more of these assumptions often appear to be violated because people do not play Nash or more refined equilibria (learning sometimes reduces violations but not always). It is usually difficult to tell from strategy choices alone which assumptions a subject is violating. Since game- theoretic solution concepts can be interpreted as algorithms for choosing a strategy, we can test the algorithms directly using a computer system that records what information in a game (e.g., which payoffs) a subject is looking at, and for how long, along with their choices. The information processing data are revealed preferences for information, which can be used to infer an unobservable thinking process. We can also measure the effect of learning on information processing to see how subjects learn, and whether they learn optimal responses or general principles (e.g., solution concepts). The games and ideas that will be studied in this project include: sequencing bargaining, forward induction, Nash vs. subgame perfection, and "almost common knowledge" games. |
0.915 |
1995 — 1998 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research On Experimental Studies of Iterated Rationality in Noncooperative Games @ California Institute of Technology This is a collaborative proposal with Dr. Ho (SBR-9511137). The PIs propose to study iterated rationality in the context of economic game theory. Iterated rationality refers to the belief that others are rational, that others believe that you are rational, that you believe that others believe that you are rational, etc. Iterated rationality is a central assumption of game-theoretic analyses that have been applied to a large number of phenomena in economics, psychology, and other social sciences. Since the empirical basis for this assumption is weak, the PIs plan to examine it in several ways. First, they will use a numbers game in which the estimate of a winning number by a contestant reveals to what extent that contestant believes in iterated rationality. Second, they will use variations of the numbers game in order to determine which changes in the procedure foster more rational choices. Such procedural changes will provide clues as to subjects assumptions about the rationality of their opponents. Third, the PIs will examine participants with various characteristics, such as group homogeneity or experience with the numbers game, in order to determine what factors influence participants rationality. Finally the PIs will examine whether what a participant learns about rationality in one game transfers to a different game. |
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1998 — 2000 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research: On Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games @ California Institute of Technology In strategic situations, people, firms, or nations care about what others are likely to do. Examples of such situations include bargaining, business decisions which require coordinating various activities, or 'signaling games' in which the actions people take signal something about their abilities or intentions. In the last few decades, a large body of mathematical 'game theory' has developed about how people will make choices in these situations. However, these theories generally assume that people know or can figure out how other people in the strategic situation are likely to behave. In fact, people usually figure out what others are likely to do by learning from experience. Our project proposes a general theory of how this learning occurs. The theory combines two very different forces - 'reinforcement,' which means that successful strategies will be repeated, and 'belief learning,' which means that players keep track of what other people have done to figure out what those people will do in the future, then they choose strategies which will give the biggest payoff if their guesses are right. These different types of learning were thought to be different for about 50 years. In earlier NSF-funded research, we discovered that the two theories are actually special kinds of a single kind of learning, 'experience weighted attraction' (EWA) learning. The current research proposes to extend the EWA theory in three ways -- to incorporate the obvious fact that different people may learn in different ways; to extend the theory to cases where people aren't sure what the payoffs from different choices are (which is of course more realistic); and to allow the possibility that people realize, as they learn about what their opponents do, that their opponents are learning also. When the extensions are incorporated we will have a very general theory of learning which can explain the way people bargain, coordinate, and signal to each other changes over time in response to experience. |
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2000 — 2003 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research: Sophisticated Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games @ California Institute of Technology Camerer #0078911 |
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2001 — 2003 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research: An Experimental Approach to Organizational Culture @ California Institute of Technology Organizational culture is a familiar concept to both researchers and |
1 |
2004 — 2008 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research: the Measurement and Neural Foundations of Strategic Iq @ California Institute of Technology The investigators will combine approaches from economics, decision science, and cognitive neuroscience. The goal is to develop a system to measure how well different people reason in strategic social situations, and to explore how specific parts of the brain may be involved in strategic decision making. |
1 |
2007 — 2013 | Camerer, Colin Quartz, Steven [⬀] Adolphs, Ralph (co-PI) [⬀] Koch, Christof (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
@ California Institute of Technology This Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship (IGERT) award supports the development of a multidisciplinary graduate training program in Brain, Mind, and Society. Its purpose is to provide students with the analytical foundations and the experimental skills needed to pursue scientific careers at the intersection of neuroscience and the social sciences, who are capable of integrating neural, psychological, and economic approaches to attack basic and applied problems related to valuation, human decision making, and social exchange. Trainees will take a rigorously designed, largely team-taught course sequence, spanning from nervous system organization and function to mathematical models of decision making and social exchange. This coursework will be complemented by equal balance in cross-disciplinary laboratory research, thereby tightly integrating research training with scholarship to create true intellectual hybrids across both disciplines. |
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2009 — 2012 | Camerer, Colin Rangel, Antonio (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Using Neurometric Data to Measure Economic Values in Private and Social Exchange Situations @ California Institute of Technology "This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 |
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2012 — 2016 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Bayesian Rapid Optimal Adaptive Design (Broad) For Estimating @ California Institute of Technology In this project the Principal Investigators will develop methods to rapidly personalize the series of questions that are asked in an experiment or survey, adjusting new questions based on a respondent?s previous answers and the speed of their responses. The methods guarantee, mathematically, that the most informative question is being asked at each step. The software challenge is being able to recompute rapidly on a variety of computer platforms. We will also make software user-friendly and widely available. |
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2013 — 2018 | Luks, Samantha Snowberg, Erik (co-PI) [⬀] Camerer, Colin Ortoleva, Pietro (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Ibss: Links Between Behavior and Attitudes Across Cultures @ California Institute of Technology This project will focus on identifying fundamental attributes of economic decision making, a set of measurements that the researchers call "econographics. The project also will focus on measuring econographics in countries throughout the world and within the U.S. over time, and as well as examining how these attributes relate to popular attitudes and participation in governmental processes. The researchers will conduct an incentivized survey that will measure econographics across thirteen countries, and over three times within the U.S. The countries selected to survey include many different types of governmental and economic environments, including parliamentary democracies with high redistribution, federal systems with a large informal economies, transitional democracies, developing democracies and authoritarian states. These states also have a variety of economic systems. Through their measurement of econographics across a broad spectrum of countries, the researchers will test hypotheses related to the processes through which these fundamental attributes correspond with the political environment and with economic performance. The three survey waves within the U.S. will straddle a national election to examine how major national events, which are known to change popular attitudes, affect econographics. |
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2014 — 2017 | Camerer, Colin | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Collaborative Research: Understanding and Predicting Asset Price Bubbles From Brain Activity @ California Institute of Technology The research team includes researchers at Caltech and Virginia Tech with expertise in Economics and Cognitive Neuroscience. They will study how the human brain works when faced with the tasks that are part of buying and selling in asset markets. They plan to use lab experiments with market designs that encourage the formation of market bubbles, periods where the price paid for an asset is well above the actual value of the asset. They want to determine whether traders who buy at high "bubble" prices are systematically different than other more cautious buyers. They will use brain imaging techniques and analyze the resulting data to test whether neural activity can predict how large a bubble will become and how long it will last. Because market bubbles can have serious consequences on the broader economy, understanding more about the possible causes of bubbles is important for financial market regulation. |
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2020 — 2021 | Camerer, Colin Shum, Matthew Jin, Lawrence Xin, Yi |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Rapid: Analyzing Forced Habit Change From Covid-19 Using Large-Scale Data @ California Institute of Technology During the COVID-19 pandemic, people were forced to try new routine at school, work, and home ? ?forced exploration?. That is, habits used to guide how we work, conduct our daily routine, exercise, eat, go to school, and interact with friends and neighbors, Habits are formed to make the same routines effortless, to save time and mental effort, when routine choices work well. However, while the mental savings from habits are a benefit, when people are choosing habitually, they may not be exploring other options which could be even better? that is the hidden cost of habit. Forced exploration can actually be beneficial if it shows people better ways of school, work, and social interaction. This kind of exploration is like going to your favorite restaurant and finding out they have run out of your favorite dish ? now you have to try something new, which you would not have explored without the disruption. This wave of forced exploration raises important questions: What new habits are formed that will persist? what will be the ?new normal?? Consider, for example, wearing a face-mask outside of the house. This is exactly the kind of ?muscle memory? behavior that usually habitizes? it can be triggered while stepping out of your car, or entering a store, and quickly becomes automatic and effortless. Whether a lot of other people are wearing masks or not can also be a trigger that prompts habit (in either direction).The same question arises across the board: Will people go back to movie theaters (or stay home with streaming)? Will restaurants fully reopen or will home delivery take over? Will knowledge firms switch to more remote ?tele-work?? Will schools find better mixtures of home learning and in-school activity? This project will analyze two different kinds of big data to test whether or not this kind of forced exploration really does result in new habits. |
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