Year |
Citation |
Score |
2020 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints The Japanese Economic Review. 71: 101-133. DOI: 10.1007/S42973-019-00002-1 |
0.33 |
|
2020 |
Hirata D, Kamada Y. Extreme donors and policy convergence Social Choice and Welfare. 55: 149-176. DOI: 10.1007/S00355-019-01234-1 |
0.305 |
|
2018 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition Theoretical Economics. 13: 761-793. DOI: 10.3982/Te2717 |
0.335 |
|
2018 |
Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 364-381. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.12.021 |
0.531 |
|
2017 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Recent Developments in Matching with Constraints The American Economic Review. 107: 200-204. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.P20171047 |
0.311 |
|
2017 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints Journal of Economic Theory. 168: 107-142. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.12.006 |
0.339 |
|
2015 |
Fudenberg D, Kamada Y. Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium Theoretical Economics. 10: 775-806. DOI: 10.3982/Te1362 |
0.518 |
|
2015 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications American Economic Review. 105: 67-99. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.20101552 |
0.345 |
|
2014 |
Calcagno R, Kamada Y, Lovo S, Sugaya T. Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games Theoretical Economics. 9: 409-434. DOI: 10.3982/Te1202 |
0.38 |
|
2013 |
Ambrus A, Azevedo EM, Kamada Y. Hierarchical cheap talk Theoretical Economics. 8: 233-261. DOI: 10.3982/Te1038 |
0.35 |
|
2013 |
Ambrus A, Azevedo EM, Kamada Y, Takagi Y. Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 94: 103-115. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2013.08.003 |
0.305 |
|
2012 |
Kamada Y, Kojima F. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A problem in the Japanese medical match and its solution American Economic Review. 102: 366-370. DOI: 10.1257/Aer.102.3.366 |
0.31 |
|
2010 |
Kamada Y, Kominers SD. Information can wreck cooperation: A counterpoint to Kandori (1992) Economics Letters. 107: 112-114. DOI: 10.1016/J.Econlet.2009.12.040 |
0.305 |
|
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