Lucas A. Rentschler, Ph.D. - Publications
Affiliations: | 2010 | Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, United States |
Area:
General EconomicsYear | Citation | Score | |||
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2019 | Aimone JA, North C, Rentschler L. Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 160: 158-167. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2019.01.022 | 0.331 | |||
2019 | Aycinena D, Rentschler L. Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments European Journal of Political Economy. 60: 101803. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ejpoleco.2019.07.001 | 0.494 | |||
2019 | Aycinena D, Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence Public Choice. 179: 195-208. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-018-0568-7 | 0.42 | |||
2019 | Boudreau JW, Rentschler L, Sanders S. Stag hunt contests and alliance formation Public Choice. 179: 267-285. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-018-0567-8 | 0.301 | |||
2018 | Grosskopf B, Rentschler L, Sarin R. An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 40-64. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.12.013 | 0.467 | |||
2018 | Aycinena D, Rentschler L. Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence Experimental Economics. 21: 924-949. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-017-9558-8 | 0.509 | |||
2018 | Aycinena D, Bejarano H, Rentschler L. Informed Entry in Auctions International Journal of Game Theory. 47: 175-205. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-017-0583-9 | 0.443 | |||
2016 | Rentschler L, Turocy TL. Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case Journal of Economic Theory. 163: 435-466. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.02.005 | 0.387 | |||
2014 | Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation Theoretical Economics Letters. 4: 619-622. DOI: 10.4236/Tel.2014.48078 | 0.377 | |||
2014 | Aycinena D, Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation Experimental Economics. 17: 100-128. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-013-9359-7 | 0.435 | |||
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