Lucas A. Rentschler, Ph.D. - Publications

Affiliations: 
2010 Texas A & M University, College Station, TX, United States 
Area:
General Economics

10 high-probability publications. We are testing a new system for linking publications to authors. You can help! If you notice any inaccuracies, please sign in and mark papers as correct or incorrect matches. If you identify any major omissions or other inaccuracies in the publication list, please let us know.

Year Citation  Score
2019 Aimone JA, North C, Rentschler L. Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 160: 158-167. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jebo.2019.01.022  0.331
2019 Aycinena D, Rentschler L. Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments European Journal of Political Economy. 60: 101803. DOI: 10.1016/J.Ejpoleco.2019.07.001  0.494
2019 Aycinena D, Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence Public Choice. 179: 195-208. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-018-0568-7  0.42
2019 Boudreau JW, Rentschler L, Sanders S. Stag hunt contests and alliance formation Public Choice. 179: 267-285. DOI: 10.1007/S11127-018-0567-8  0.301
2018 Grosskopf B, Rentschler L, Sarin R. An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner Games and Economic Behavior. 109: 40-64. DOI: 10.1016/J.Geb.2017.12.013  0.467
2018 Aycinena D, Rentschler L. Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence Experimental Economics. 21: 924-949. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-017-9558-8  0.509
2018 Aycinena D, Bejarano H, Rentschler L. Informed Entry in Auctions International Journal of Game Theory. 47: 175-205. DOI: 10.1007/S00182-017-0583-9  0.443
2016 Rentschler L, Turocy TL. Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case Journal of Economic Theory. 163: 435-466. DOI: 10.1016/J.Jet.2016.02.005  0.387
2014 Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation Theoretical Economics Letters. 4: 619-622. DOI: 10.4236/Tel.2014.48078  0.377
2014 Aycinena D, Baltaduonis R, Rentschler L. Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation Experimental Economics. 17: 100-128. DOI: 10.1007/S10683-013-9359-7  0.435
Show low-probability matches.