Charles W. Kalish - US grants
Affiliations: | University of Wisconsin, Madison, Madison, WI |
Area:
Developmental Psychology, Cognitive PsychologyWe are testing a new system for linking grants to scientists.
The funding information displayed below comes from the NIH Research Portfolio Online Reporting Tools and the NSF Award Database.The grant data on this page is limited to grants awarded in the United States and is thus partial. It can nonetheless be used to understand how funding patterns influence mentorship networks and vice-versa, which has deep implications on how research is done.
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High-probability grants
According to our matching algorithm, Charles W. Kalish is the likely recipient of the following grants.Years | Recipients | Code | Title / Keywords | Matching score |
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2000 — 2003 | Kalish, Charles W | R01Activity Code Description: To support a discrete, specified, circumscribed project to be performed by the named investigator(s) in an area representing his or her specific interest and competencies. |
Children's Reasoning About Natural and Intentional Cause @ University of Wisconsin Madison Reasoning about causal relationships (e.g., forming and testing hypotheses) is increasingly seen as an important focus of early science education and as a central mechanism of cognitive development. In this proposal I examine the strategies young children use in causal reasoning tasks. In particular, I suggest that two classes of strategies may guide reasoning: those consistent with conceptions of natural causes and those consistent with intentional causes. The primary focus of this proposal will be the reasoning strategies used by five-year-olds. Participants will be presented with stories describing novel causal relations (e.g., a substance that turns blue in the freezer) and asked to make predictions and interpretations about these relations. At least as adults we have different ways of making inductions and judging the certainty of inferences in natural and intentional contexts. Children may have different strategies than adults and/or use their strategies differently. For example, children may believe that more events and behaviors are under voluntary control than do adults. Alternatively, or in addition, children may have a general bias to use the weaker reasoning strategies characteristic of intentional causation. One consequence of this perspective is that children's difficulties with formal scientific reasoning may be less of a general inability than a misunderstanding or a misapplication of strategies appropriate to particular content domains. Further, if strategies really are part of common sense then they are part of the background knowledge that children bring to learning environments. Causal reasoning strategies may be both sources of error and possible frameworks for understanding elaborated scientific content. |
1 |
2004 — 2006 | Smetana, Judith (co-PI) [⬀] Killen, Melanie (co-PI) [⬀] Kalish, Charles Leslie, Alan (co-PI) [⬀] Wainryb, Cecilia (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
@ University of Wisconsin-Madison This project supports a workshop on the topic of how children come to understand norms, rules, and obligations: a social cognition of norms. The workshop will bring together scholars who are leaders in the fields of moral development and theory of mind. While moral development research has, over the last 20 years, documented the richness of children's knowledge of principles of justice, fairness, and rights, only recently have moral development researchers started asking how children's psychological understandings inform their moral thinking. During the same time period, there has been an extensive research program on children's knowledge about others' psychological states, referred to as "theory of mind". Parallel to the new directions in moral development research, an emerging direction for theory of mind research is exploring the relation between normative and psychological construals of human action. Surprisingly, there has been little collaboration between researchers on children's moral development and researchers on children's theory of mind, despite the extensive lines of research in these two respective areas and the potential conceptual overlaps. The charge of this workshop will be to explore how those perspectives together generate a deeper understanding of the social cognition of normative relations. If the goal is to develop a full account of how children develop the abilities to use and form norms, rules, permissions, and obligations, what are the key concepts and distinctions? The challenge is to define a field of reasoning about norms, and to encourage researchers to view existing questions in this new light. |
0.915 |
2008 — 2012 | Kalish, Charles Hora, Matthew Millar, Susan |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
@ University of Wisconsin-Madison This study is intended to develop better understanding of why changes in reform-based practices in higher education are slow to develop. The project aims to increase understanding of the relationship between mental models of faculty about effective pedagogy in STEM fields and the extent of consensus about such pedagogy. The research will also examine individual and institutional factors that may influence mental models and consensus and the individual and group level factors that are related to teaching practices and changes in cognitive structure and consensus over time. The study will use cognitive frameworks to explain institutional inertia and will develop methodological approaches to examine several different units of analysis using both cognitive and cultural frameworks. The investigators will create an evaluation design that will be tested in higher education institutions. It will describe the mental models held by individual faculty about effective pedagogy, describe the groups that have consensus on these structures, and describe how individuals and institutions vary in teaching approaches. The study will measure changes in faculty views of pedagogical practices over time by following faculty over time. Data will be gathered from faculty in math, life science and physical sciences over a three year period. The primary source of data will be a survey instrument given in the first and third year. There will also be in-dept interviews with subsets of faculty. |
0.915 |
2008 — 2013 | Kalish, Charles | N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
Development of Conditional Probability Judgments @ University of Wisconsin-Madison Learning from experience is one of the most basic and important cognitive problems, for both adults and, especially, for young children. Much of this learning takes the form of conditional probability judgments: judging what outcomes are likely given some evidence. This project explores the development of such conditional probability judgments. Specifically, how do children use examples they know about to make predictions about unfamiliar cases? The significance of some examples depend on 1) which population one is concerned about (e.g., the conditional one is assessing) and 2) the population sampled from (e.g., how the evidence was generated). Asking how and when children are sensitive to differences in conditionals and sampling addresses longstanding debates about the role of inferential and similarity-based processes in cognitive development. The results of this work will illustrate ways in which basic similarity models must be elaborated to account for children's conditional judgments. In addition, a developmental perspective is critical for understanding why adults do or do not adequately account for conditionals and sampling in their judgments. Finally, conditional probability judgments are just such a basic feature of cognition that understanding their development is central to a wide range of psychological phenomena and theories. |
0.915 |
2008 — 2013 | Knuth, Eric [⬀] Kalish, Charles Ellis, Amy (co-PI) [⬀] |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
@ University of Wisconsin-Madison Many consider mathematical reasoning to be a basic mathematical skill and inseparable from knowing and using mathematics. Yet despite its importance, mathematics education research continues to paint a bleak picture of students' abilities to reason mathematically. In contrast, cognitive science research has revealed surprising strengths in children's abilities to reason in non-mathematical domains, suggesting that children are capable of developing complex and abstract causal theories, and of using powerful strategies of inductive inference. Thus, this raises something of a paradox: Why are children so good at reasoning in non-mathematical domains, yet so poor at reasoning in mathematical domains? The purpose of this study is to explore this seeming paradox. In particular, our goal is to extend the cognitive science research into the domain of mathematics education and, more specifically, into the domain of middle school mathematics. We seek to understand the strengths and weaknesses of students' reasoning in and out of mathematics, to understand the connections between students' reasoning in different domains, and, ultimately, to improve students' abilities to reason mathematically. |
0.915 |
2013 — 2017 | Kalish, Charles Rosengren, Karl |
N/AActivity Code Description: No activity code was retrieved: click on the grant title for more information |
@ University of Wisconsin-Madison Learning patterns from exposure to examples is a basic cognitive process and an important focus of early STEM education. It is because we know many patterns that we can make predictions about new instances: Will a goat bleat? Will it eat tin cans? Children learn about patterns in many different ways and in many different contexts (e.g., at home, in school, in museums). The goal of this project is to understand how different contexts of exposure lead to different forms of pattern learning. For example, children may learn a single pattern really well given a clear task and corrective feedback, but learn only that one pattern. If all a child is asked to do is sort animals into a pile of "bleaters" and "non-bleaters," he or she will get good at distinguishing goats from sheep, but will not learn anything more about animals. In more exploratory contexts (e.g., free-sorting or free-play) children may learn multiple patterns at the same time, but perhaps not learn any one pattern really well. A child may notice lots of things about the various animals encountered at a petting zoo, including "irrelevant patterns" (the goats are mostly brown), but may not notice complex patterns or become adept at using any particular pattern to make predictions (e.g., telling the goats from the sheep). The specific idea motivating this study is a the prediction of a theoretical tradeoff in learning between focus and flexibility. Empirical research explores this tradeoff and the conditions that lead to more or less focused and flexible learning. |
0.915 |